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NIS 30

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

IRAQ

SECTION 42

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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER IV

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

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Tab 3

Army	FEMA	NSA
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DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
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This Section was prepared for the NIS by the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State.

42. Characteristics of the People

A. General

The population of Iraq is characterized by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socio-economic differences which are pronounced. Race and language differences separate the Kurds from the Arab majority; differences of race, language, and religion separate the other minorities from the Arabs; and a denominational difference, in the case of the Sunni and Shiah Muslims, divide even the Arab majority. The amount of national unity achieved on important issues is dependent on the degree to which these differences can be subordinated to the national good. An aid to this end is the continuous role played by the Tigris-Euphrates valley in diminishing the physical and psychological barriers that divide the various ethnic groups.

The socio-economic factor as an apparent force toward disunity is not in proportion to the size of the gulf that exists between the economic extremes. The middle class is a relatively small, closely-knit group made up of urban merchants, artisans, traders, etc. The great bulk of the population is a rural one in which poverty is the usual accepted norm. At the opposite extreme are the tribal sheikhs, the wealthy landowners, and the Arab aristocracy, a comparative handful who control the wealth and the government of the country. Custom, ignorance, ill health, and malnutrition all are factors in the complacent attitude toward these economic extremes. Most compelling, however, is a combination of the powerful tradition of tribal unity, according to which the head of the family or tribe cares for those in need, and the concept of feudal overlordship which by recognition of the relationship between lord and servant has become through the centuries the conventionalized social pattern. At the same time the tribal tradition which erases the purely social gulf which might otherwise exist between the rich and the poor has become a powerful force toward family or tribal cohesion beyond the bonds of political or national unity.

These differences, and the absence of an established tradition of group cooperation within the national framework, make national unity on policies of a controversial nature unlikely. They also have an adverse influence on Iraqi national receptiveness to opportunities for honest and advantageous cooperation with other nations both within the Arab League and beyond.

Individually the average Iraqi is unrealistic in his outlook, emotional, and intense. He expects much for little effort and at the same time is sensitive over his social and material backwardness.

Sociological factors for strength are found in the qualities of loyalty to the tribe or family, frugality, and patient acquiescence to the hardships of life. Factors for unity exist in the common bond of Islam affecting a majority of the population, and in pride of race, language, and history on the part of the Arab component. Despite these, the factors which make for weakness and disunity predominate in Iraq.

For the purely religious aspects of the sociological conditions to be discussed below reference should be made to SECTION 43 of this Chapter, under Religion. For the political interpretation, see CHAPTER V, SECTIONS 53 (Political Dynamics) and 55 (National Policies).

B. Physical characteristics

1. Arabs

a. RACIAL ORIGIN — When the Arab forces of militant Islam entered the Tigris-Euphrates valley in A.D. 634, it was even then a land which for millennia had been continuously inhabited by successive groups of people who, though of diverse cultural and ethnical origins, had evolved into a relatively homogeneous anthropological type. Throughout this evolution the basic physical character remained Semitic-Mediterranean despite the additional leavening influence of alien peoples who intruded periodically from the highlands to the north and east. The Arabs proper – the inhabitants of Central Arabia – played a dominant role in establishing this physical pattern, serving as they had since time immemorial as a reservoir of manpower for the needs and opportunities of the Tigris-Euphrates valley.

b. PHYSICAL TYPE — Anthropologically the Iraqi Arabs of today range from the classic Bedouin type of Central Arabia to the somewhat mixed Semitic-Mediterraneans who have evolved through many millennia in the Tigris-Euphrates valley. The term "Arab" as used in the broad sense is essentially a linguistic designation, since it applies to those whose native tongue is now Arabic (not including the Jews) without regard for their social

NOTE SECTION 42 is based on material available in July 1950.

and ethnic background. Thus it includes such diverse groups as the Bedouins, the Marsh Arabs (*Ma'dān*) and the non-tribal townsmen, and such cultural opposites as Shiah Muslims and Christian Arabs. Despite these differences certain generalizations can be made in regard to Iraqi Arab physical characteristics.

As members of the Mediterranean race they are predominantly dolichocephalic, or long-headed. Occasional examples of brachycephalic or broad-headed individuals point to Armenoid intrusions. Their height ranges from 5 feet 4 inches to 5 feet 8 inches, and they are slightly built. The pigmentation of their skin varies from light brown to deep copper; their hair is very dark brown and slightly wavy; while the color of their eyes ranges from greyish-brown to very dark brown with occasional occurrences of blue. Noses range from the finely-chiseled, arched type seen among the Bedouin aristocracy to the short, straight nasal profile more characteristic of the mixed population of urban Iraq. Not infrequent exaggerated curvature in nasal profile points again to Armenoid intrusion.

Differences in the physical pattern coincide with the various social and occupational groups. The Bedouin (see FIGURES 42–4A and 42–4B), as the classic Semitic-Mediterranean, is spare, with narrow hands and feet, deep-set dark brown eyes, and features that are often described as ascetic. His continual exposure to the elements results in a very dark skin color, which on occasion is accentuated by a negroid inheritance from the African slaves who as bodyguards, wives, and concubines were until recent times an integral part of wealthy Bedouin households. The urban Arab tends to be less spare than the Bedouin, though obesity is rare. Skin color is lighter, face somewhat fuller and the incidence of the arched nasal profile characteristic of the Bedouin less common. Despite the adulteration introduced by these urban and cosmopolitan blood strains the basic Semitic-Mediterranean long-headedness persists in all areas not preponderantly Kurdish or Turkish. The effect of geographical location on physical similarity among the Iraqi Arabs as a whole is not pronounced and is restricted primarily to the increased length and breadth of face characteristic of northern Iraq.

The ability of the Bedouin to sustain the hardships and short rations of desert life is proverbial. Nevertheless, because of his adjustment to an inclement climate and to habitual under-nourishment, his reserve of expendible energy is small. Exertion considered as average for an American laborer cannot be expected of the Bedouin, though work pitched at a lower exertion rate can be sustained over long periods. Increased labor output is primarily conditional upon improvement in health and nourishment, conditions which are not necessarily better in Iraqi urban life than among the Bedouin. Urban workers, however, are reared with a stronger tradition of the inevitability of labor and consequently are subject to fewer of those psychological obstacles of pride and habit that beset the Bedouin.

c. NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION — The figure of 3,568,000 for the Arab component in the total population shown in FIGURE 42–1 is as close an approximation as can be reached from the inadequate census data available. Adequate data are also not available to show what proportion of this figure applies to the Bedouin (Arab nomads without fixed abode). The fact that estimates by normally reliable observers vary from 80,000 to 1,000,000 illustrates not only the lack of accurate data but the virtual impossibility of fixing a precise division between nomadism and semi-nomadism. It is probable that the number of Arabs in Iraq who still follow the Bedouin way of life does not exceed 200,000. Distribution of the Arab component in the population as shown on the map, FIGURE 42–2, coincides with the northeastern limits of the Semitic dispersion from the Arabian homeland.

(1) *Arab nomads* — The true nomad follows the pastures from season to season within the limits of his tribal *dīrah* (preserve). Among the Arabs the Bedouin is the nomad par excellence. He looks with disdain on those who stoop to work on the land or in the shop and even on those who forsake the camel in favor of the more profitable sheep and goat. His interest is confined primarily to intertribal alliance and conflict, to the niceties of long-established tribal customs and to the maintenance of his right to personal independence

FIGURE 42–1. PRINCIPAL IRAQI ETHNIC AND CULTURAL GROUPS, 1948

ETHNIC OR CULTURAL GROUP	RELIGIOUS SECT	PRIMARY LANGUAGE	ESTIMATED NUMBER
Muslim Arabs	Sunni and Shiah Islam	Arabic	3,568,000
Kurds	Sunni Islam	Kurdish	807,000
Turkomans	Sunni Islam	Turkomani	*50,000
Iranians	Shiah Islam	Iranian	40,000
Christians	Jacobite, Nestorian, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Greek Catholic, Protestant	Neo-Syriac, Arabic, Armenian	190,000
Jews	Judaism	Arabic	125,000
Yezidis	Yezidism	Kurdish	*15,000
Mandaeans	Mandaeism	Mandaean	*5,000

* Data from official Iraqi census; Turkoman and Yezidi figures probably represent an underenumeration.



FIGURE 42–2. RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION, IRAQ, 1950

within the easy confines of tribal law. To the bulk of the population the Bedouin epitomizes the traditional Arab virtues, but from the viewpoint of economic reality he represents a diminishing element which in ever-increasing numbers is being forced into agricultural and industrial labor.

The nomad tribes are located chiefly in western and southern Iraq (see FIGURE 42–6). The great Bedouin Shammar tribe of north-central Arabia and of Syria is represented in Iraq by a branch, the Shammar al-Jarbā' (FIGURES 42–4A and 42–4B). They range the Al Jazīra from the Jabal Sinjar region in the Mosul *liwā'* (province) to the regions immediately west and south of Baghdad. Their sheikhs are politically powerful and wealthy, having invested extensively in irrigated farm land. While as Bedouin they traditionally scorn the farmer, approximately 1,000 Shammar al-Jarbā' families homesteaded in Mosul liwā' during 1949. In all they number about 90,000 persons.

Other important nomad tribes are the 'Amārāt 'Unayzah and the az-Zafīr. The 'Amārāt 'Unayzah, like the Shammar al-Jarbā', are a subsection of a distinguished and much larger Central Arabian clan. They summer along the western bank of the Euphrates, extending as far south as Karbalā, and in the winter migrate to and often across the Syrian border to the west. They number about 50,000 persons in all. Their relatives, the Ruwallā, with whom they are on hostile terms, often cross into westernmost Iraq in transit between Saudi Arabia and Syria.

The az-Zafīr (often spelled Dhafir), while not of as aristocratic lineage nor as wealthy as the Shammar al-Jarba' or the 'Amārāt 'Unayzah, nevertheless occupy an important position as a buffer between Saudi Arabia and the rice growers of the lower Tigris. They are very poor and are reduced to approximately 750 tents or families.

Subdivisions of other tribes also still depend on the camel and adhere to the Bedouin tradition of nomadism, the most important being the al-'Ubayd, a majority of whom continue in the nomadic pattern. They number in all about 8,000 persons and migrate from the Tigris to the Kurdish foothills in the area between Kirkūk and Baghdad. Other tribes with Bedouin subdivisions are the al-'Azzah, the Shammar Tōqah, the Bani Tamīm, and the Bani Lām.

Shepherds today far outnumber the Bedouin, and the ad-Dulaym constitute the most extensive of the shepherd tribes. They range throughout northern Dulaim liwā' and are found in a multitude of subdivisions on either side of the Euphrates upstream from Al Fallūja. In all, including both the nomadic shepherds and the substantial proportion which has taken up farming, they number about 125,000 persons. Many other tribes in lesser but important degrees are divided into settled agricultural and nomadic sheep-herding sections, notably the al-Khazā'il of the Middle Euphrates, the Zayyād and the al-Budhūr of the lower Euphrates, and various of the tribes in the Muntafiq confederation.

The Sulaybah are also true nomads, who as a small group of outcasts range undisturbed through the tribal districts of the Bedouin as hunters, tinkers, smiths, carpenters, and purveyors of primitive medical services for man and beast. Their abilities in specialized skills are utilized by all nomadic groups. They are primitive in dress, retiring, and cultivate an appearance of poverty. In Iraq they number perhaps 750 tents or families.

(2) *Arab settled and semi-settled tribes* (FIGURE 42–6)

(a) UPPER EUPHRATES — The ad-Dulaym, already mentioned as nomadic shepherds, are equally numerous and important as settled agriculturalists on either side of the Upper Euphrates as far south as Ramādī. The al-Jumaylah and Ālbu 'Īsa are the most important of the Dulaym subtribes which have settled on the land.

(b) MIDDLE EUPHRATES — The outstanding tribes are: al-Fatlah, the most important tribe in the Middle Euphrates; al-Khazā'il, in reality not a tribe but a sheikhly family (about 50 members) of great prestige with a large following among adjacent tribes, the Bani Salāmah in particular; the Bani Hukaym, a confederation of about 12 smaller tribes now becoming disunited; the Budayr, a large but scattered tribe; and the Afaj, an important tribe in a rich farming district.

(c) LOWER EUPHRATES — The area along the Shatt al Gharrāf from Kūt al Hai south to the Shatt al Arab and from the Euphrates almost to the Tigris is the land of the great al-Muntafiq federation. This is the tribal area par excellence. The tribes are well armed and display an attitude of aggressive independence that makes the government hesitant to press seriously such matters as conscription and other public obligations. The proportion of small landholders here is larger than in other tribal areas, and while feudal control is absolute among the separate tribes its responsibilities toward individuals are perhaps more strictly observed than elsewhere. Ultimate control of the Muntafiq is in the hands of the powerful Shabib-Sa'dūn family, who epitomize the traditional nomad virtues and who, though Sunni, still maintain control over their uniformly Shiah tribal followers. The Muntafiq is itself a federation of confederations, and though declining in unity it is still a powerful force in tribal and national matters. It consists of a multitude of separate tribes, only the most important of which will be mentioned. The first confederation is the Ajwad, in which are the

following lesser confederations and tribes: the Bani Rikāb and al-Humayd, themselves confederations of smaller groups; the rich farming tribe Bani Zayd, al-Uzayrij, and the shepherd Khafājah tribe. The second confederation, the Bani Malik, is made up of the rice growing Ahl al-Kūt, the large disunited Bani Khayqan, and the semi-nomadic Ālbu Sālih. The third confederation, the Bani Sa'īd, consists primarily of the semi-nomadic tribe of that name which occupies the region between the Shatt al Gharrāf and the Tigris marshes.

(d) UPPER TIGRIS — The al-'Ubayd have already been mentioned under nomadic tribes but also deserve attention here as the beneficiaries under the governmental Hawījah Land Scheme for tribal settlement in Kirkūk liwā'. The al-Jubūr are settled peasants; though they are one of the largest tribes in Iraq they are scattered and disunited.

(e) MIDDLE TIGRIS — No great tribes remain in this section, though remnants of the once great, such as the Bani Tamīm, are still to be found. The al-Juhaysh are a part of the tribe of the same name found near Mosul. The Zubayd are relatively important, though of diminishing tribal influence, and the al-'Azzah, while mainly nomadic shepherds, also have important numbers of settled peasants. The Shammar Tōqah are divided between nomadic herdsmen and settled cultivators along the Tigris and in the Balad Rūz area. Most important of the Middle Tigris tribes are the Bani Rabī'ah, who in themselves are a federation of smaller tribes. Their sheikhs are extremely wealthy, having appropriated to themselves the government land intended for tribal ownership. Extending southward from Kūt al Imāra along the Shatt al Gharrāf they come within the area of the Dujaila Land Scheme through which improved government land is made available to landless peasants for homesteading.

(f) LOWER TIGRIS — The tribes of the lower Tigris, from Shaikh Sa'ad to the Shatt al Arab, are more peaceful and settled than those to the west, who look down on the former as lacking in purity of blood and in the traditional tribal virtues. In this region there is also a tendency toward the disintegration of the tribe and the substitution of feudal estates worked by any peasants available for service. The sheikhs lease their land from the government and support their own personal troops in proportion to their importance.

The Ālbu Muhammad are the most numerous (approximately 100,000 persons) and the most important of the lower Tigris tribes. They are wealthy rice cultivators and buffalo herders, and in their mode of living they share many features with the Ma'dan or Marsh Arabs, among whom they are interspersed and with whom they have intermarried. Most of their land is marshy, and their dependence on the *mashhūf* or skiff for transport and on reeds for building material is common to other marsh dwellers. The Bani Lām, once a great Bedouin federation and lords of the Lower Tigris, are now a poverty-stricken group. They still retain some few Bedouin sections, but the bulk of their members have been forced into manual labor in the fields and in the cities. The al-Uzayrij, the as-Sawā 'id, and the Ālbu Darrāj are important as rice growers.

The Marsh Arabs, or Ma'dān, inhabit an estimated 3,000,000 acres of swampland roughly bounded by the Tigris from Al Qurnah almost to 'Amāra on the east, by Hōr al Hammār (Lake) to An Nāsirīya on the south, and by the Shatt al Gharrāf on the west as shown in FIGURE 42–2. They are interspersed with the Ālbu Muhammad and various Muntafiq subtribes, living in the most inaccessible portions of the marshland well beyond any effective government control. They depend on the *mashhūf* for transportation and on buffalo, fish, and rice for food. The towering jungles of reeds that border and often obscure their waterways also serve as sources of food, fuel, building material (see FIGURE 42–4C), and the raw material for woven reed products made for sale. The customs and physical characteristics of these obscure people suggest that they are not of Arab descent but are perhaps the relatively unmixed descendents of aboriginal marsh dwellers. Unlike the Bedouin they are tall, thick-set, and muscular, with broad faces and high cheek bones. Their language, however, is an Arabic of archaic character and their religion is Shiah Islam. Their reputation is one of piracy, treachery, and disregard for tribal and civil law, and to other Arabs they are considered as outcasts. Their total number as of 1943 was estimated at 300,000 persons, but since the term Ma'dān is often loosely used to refer to all marsh dwellers it is probable that this figure includes a generous percentage of other tribes who are not Ma'dān in the strict sense of the word. There are five principal Ma'dān tribes, the most important of which is al-Fartūs.

(g) SHATT AL ARAB — The population along the course of the Shatt al Arab, from Al Qurnah to the Persian Gulf, has almost completely lost its tribal character. The area is subject, however, to large seasonal influxes of tribal Arabs in late summer and early fall to work in the date harvest. Economic control of the area is in the hands of a few dominant families such as the Sa'dūn and the Naqīb, and to a lesser degree to the *sayyids* (descendents of the Prophet), who here in particular have prospered as a landlord class.

2. Kurds

a. RACIAL ORIGIN — The Kurdish homeland as such does not correspond to present-day national boundaries. In general terms it comprises the inaccessible mountainous area which straddles northeastern Iraq, northwestern Iran, southeastern Turkey, and southern Azerbaijan, while separate Kurdish communities are found well beyond these limits. Within Iraq there is no established line to differentiate between Iraqi Kurdistan and the remainder of the country. For practical purposes it may be considered as the area northeast of a line between Tel Uwaināt on the northwest and Khānaqīn on the east (for details see FIGURES 42–2 and 42–6).

The origin of the Kurdish peoples is obscure, but it is probable that the ancestors of the present-day Kurds were western Iranians who gradually absorbed or displaced an earlier people living in the present Kurdish homeland. Whatever their origins, the Kurds were fully established as a distinct ethnic and linguistic entity in their present location by the time of the Arab conquest of Iraq in the seventh century A.D. As far back as Kurdish history can be traced the same spirit of rebellious independence is found to exist that characterizes this people in modern times.

b. PHYSICAL TYPE — The basic Kurdish stock is Irano-Afghan with a liberal intermixture of Iranian Nordic. The Kurd of today averages 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 7 inches in height. He is remarkable in remaining essentially dolichocephalic even though in the closest association with the brachicephals from Armenia and Anatolia. The Kurdish nasal profile ranges from straight to markedly convex, the face is predominately long and narrow as shown in FIGURE 42–4D, and usually the complexion and hair are dark, though there is a perceptible tendency toward blue eyes and light hair color. Being traditionally a herder, cultivator, and tribal warrior, rather than a city dweller, his complexion has taken on the same deep copper color that characterizes the Bedouin. A straighter nose and broader face characterizes a sizable Kurdish minority.

The stamina of the Kurd is proverbial, and is demonstrated by his feats of strength as a porter, in which trade he has a virtual monopoly in Iraq. His resistance to disease when introduced to urban life is certainly no greater than that of the urban Arabs, but in his natural upland habitat his life expectancy exceeds that of the urban or desert Arab. His chief occupational hazard is the rifle bullet.

c. NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION — The population figure for Kurds in Iraq as of July 1948 was 807,000 or approximately 17% of the total population of the country. Distribution follows the pattern shown in FIGURES 42–2 and 42–6. While the Kurds of Iraq are essentially mountain-dwelling shepherds, a considerable number are settled and prosperous agriculturalists in the rain-fed upland plains of northeastern Iraq. The migratory tribes which once migrated northward each year beyond the borders of Iraq are no longer permitted access to their traditional Turkish pastures, but established routes of seasonal migration between Iraq and Iran are open to peaceful tribes.

d. KURDISH TRIBES — Racial character and geography combine to accentuate the inherent separatism of the Kurdish people. Their passion for individual independence encourages and perpetuates a division into many tribes which are either mutually antagonistic or at best suspicious of their neighbors. Among the Arabs, this insistence on tribal freedom of action has discouraged the formation of large or enduring tribal confederations and at the same time has been the greatest obstacle to the united action necessary to achieve the political independence that they desire. In addition, the inaccessible country in which many of them live stimulates and fosters this concept of independence. The same characteristics that make the tribal Kurd a suspicious acquaintance and a determined enemy color also the relations between tribes. Only on the western boundary of Kurdistan, where the terrain is less confining and where there have been centuries of contact with other peoples, has tribal cohesion and intolerance diminished to any marked extent.

FIGURE 42–6 shows only the principal Kurdish tribes, and the following text describes only the chief among these:

AKO—A warlike tribe well protected geographically, consisting of over 20 subtribes in some 40–50 villages. They are agricultural and pastoral, with nomadic sections migrating into Iran during the summer.

ARTUSHI—The remnant of a once powerful confederation, the main portion of which is now settled in Turkey. The Iraqi branches number perhaps 530 families, some of which are still nomadic.

BAIYAT—A prosperous tribe of settled agriculturalists of 600–1,000 families, of interest chiefly as being Kurdicized Turkomans.

BALIK—A relatively prosperous, settled tribe of agriculturalists and shepherds numbering perhaps 1,000 fighting men.

BARADOST—The paramount tribe of northeastern Iraq though now less powerful than formerly. They are remote, warlike, and number approximately 500 families of farmers and shepherds.

BARZANI—At present an unimportant tribe as an internal force, but of special significance because of the flight of its leader, Mulla Mustafa, and some of his tribesmen to the Soviet Union for refuge after their unsuccessful revolt against the Iraqi central government in 1947. Barzani tribal leaders in general are noted for their truculence.

DAUDI—An important tribe of farmers and shepherds numbering 1,000–1,200 families, living on irrigated land. It is famous for its fine wheat, horses, and mules, and for its good fighters.

DILO—A warlike tribe numbering 300–500 families. In the past it has been a constant threat to the town of Kifrī.

DIZAI—A very large, wealthy tribe, considered to be the most progressive of all tribal Kurds. This tribe consists of both cultivators and shepherds who are nomadic within their area, numbers from 4,800 to 6,000 families. Many adjacent nontribal Kurds are of Dizai origin.

DUSKI—A tribe of farmers and shepherds of approximately 1,200 families. It is characterized by strong anti-government leadership.

GIRDI—A tribe of farmers and shepherds numbering some 700–800 families. It is known for its fine horses and for the skill of its members as cavalrymen.

HAMAWAND—A warlike tribe of farmers and shepherds which exerts a strong influence on tribal intrigue in Sulaimānīya. It is estimated to consist of some 1,400 families.

HERKI—The second largest of the migratory tribes, the Herki, numbering approximately 20,000 persons. This tribe is made up of several subsections, some of which are turning to agriculture. The migratory range of the tribe is from the plains north of Erbil into northwestern Iran. It is noted for having good fighters who resent government attempts at control.

JAF—The largest of the nomadic tribes, numbering at least 2,000 good fighting men. Large numbers of this tribe have settled around Halabja, the chief town of the Kurds, and their chiefs have become wealthy landowners. Divided into many semi-autonomous subtribes, often at odds with each other, there is little tribal cohesion and no central leadership. The Jaf have the longest migratory range of all Kurdish tribes, extending into Iran in the summer.

KUSHNAO—A federation of three tribes numbering in all about 10,000 persons. It is made up of prosperous traders and growers of fruit and tobacco, with some pastoral subsections.

MIZURI—A tribe made up of peaceful farmers and shepherds, numbering approximately 1,600 families.

PIZHDER—A tribe consisting mainly of village dwelling farmers, with some nomadic elements which migrate into Iran. Outstanding and powerful with a fighting strength variously estimated at from 1,500 to 4,000 men, the tribe is famed for its self-developed bicameral parliament, high morale, and resistance to efforts at government control.

SARGALU SHEIKHS—A tribe of prosperous farmers formerly attached to Sheikh Mahmūd, long the leader of Kurdish revolt against the central government. It numbers approximately 1,000 armed men.

SHUAN—A prosperous tribe of farmers and horse and cattle breeders, unusual in its tribal cohesion. Its members—approximately 2,000 families—are good fighters, who live within easy striking distance of the Kirkūk oil fields.

SINDI—A small tribe of farmers, with some nomadic-shepherd subsections, with a reputation for turbulence and treachery. The presence of Nestorian Christians in the tribe along with the traditional Sunni Muslims is exceptional.

SURCHI—A small tribe of farmers and shepherds consisting of between 400 and 600 armed men who are in a position to control the strategic Spilik Pass.

TALABANI—An important, prosperous, settled tribe whose leaders are active in government service. It numbers approximately 1,200 fighting men.

ZIBARI—An isolated tribe of farmers and shepherds, numbering in all about 700 families, known as a haven for deserters, bandits, and other undisciplined elements. Its members, however, fought against Mulla Mustafa of the Barzani in his revolt against the central government.

Kurdish tribal leaders in most cases bear the honorific title *āgha*. Among the Kurds the title "sheikh" applies to a religious leader or to the head of a house distinguished by such leadership in the past. Such sheikhs often build up an extensive following not only from their own family and retainers but from the various tribes. The Qaradaghli Barzinji family of Sulaimānīya, headed by the famous Sheikh Mahmūd, is the prime example of extra-tribal leadership. Other sheikhs, such as the Sargalu sheikhs, have built up a more or less permanent following, and in effect have become *āghas* though they retain the older title.

3. Turkomans

a. RACIAL ORIGIN — Of the ethnic groups considered thus far the Turkomans are the first who are not to some degree indigenous to the land. In the twelfth century A.D. Iraq was overrun by Seljuk Turks invading the Fertile Crescent by way of Iran from their homeland in Central Asia, and the Turkomans in Iraq today are the descendants of these invaders.

b. PHYSICAL TYPE — As a group the Turkomans, like the Kurds, form a racial sub-type of the Irano-Afghan family, which in turn is a member of the Mediterranean race. The chief point of differentiation from other Irano-Afghans lies in their very high head vault. Their head form is dolichocephalic; the face and nose are long, though neither reach the exaggerated lengths found in Turkistan proper. The lips are thin, the hair black and of fine texture, and the eyes are brown but without trace of the Mongoloid traits seen among Turkomans further east. The Turkoman averages 5 feet 7 inches in height and has a sturdy but slender body (see FIGURE 42–5B).

The health of the Iraqi Turkoman is comparable to that of the Kurd and Arab in the same area. His capacity for work exceeds that of the average Arab. His stamina as a worker perhaps does not equal that of the Kurd, but it is compensated for by a greater sense of individual responsibility toward the job in hand.

c. NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION — The estimated number of Iraqi Turkomans as of 1948 was 50,000, or approximately 1% of the total population. As

peaceful settled agriculturalists they are found in scattered villages extending in a line from Nusaybin in Turkey through Kirkūk to Mandalī, forming in their southeasterly course a rough ethnic buffer between the Kurds to the east and the Arabs to the west (see FIGURE 42–2).

4. Others

a. JEWS — The Jews of Iraq, as cognate members of the Semitic-Mediterranean family, bear a very close cultural, linguistic and physical relationship to the Arabs, since they come from the same aboriginal progenitors as the successive waves of desert Arabs which flowed outward in antiquity from Central Arabia into the Tigris-Euphrates valley. The first Jews in Iraq, distinguishable as such, came through deportations from Palestine in late Assyrian times. However, the deportations by the Neo-Babylonian ruler Nebuchadnezzar in 596 B.C. and later in 587 B.C. were the largest and constitute the beginning of the so-called "Captivity." Conversions and arrivals of fresh communities throughout the following centuries, up to the advent of Islam, account for the persistence of the Jewish minority in Iraq.

The Iraqi Jew is of moderate stature (averaging 5 feet 5 inches), his face and nose are narrow, and the nasal profile is either straight or convex. His skull formation ranges from dolichocephalic to mesocephalic in south and central Iraq to brachycephalic in the areas of northern Iraq in conformity with the prevalent characteristics of those areas. He is distinguished anthropometrically, however, as a true Jew and not merely a Judaized Iraqi by his smaller head and face and proportionately larger nose.

The number of Jews in Iraq as of January 1950 was established at approximately 125,000, of which about 90,000 were in Baghdad, 10,000 in Basra, 6,000 in Mosul, 5,000 in Erbil, 2,800 in Kirkūk, and the remainder scattered throughout the other urban and village centers as merchants, traders, and artisans.

The number of Iraqi Jews who desire to emigrate to Israel is reported to be large. Consequently, the population figures given above are subject to substantial reduction as the opportunities for emigration improve.

b. CHRISTIANS — The Christian population is made up of Nestorian, Chaldean, Jacobite, Syrian Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and scattered lesser sects and accounts in all for about 190,000 people. While the native Christians, with the exception of the Armenians, are indigenous Semitic-Mediterraneans, the various sects take on something of the character of separate ethnic entities through their preference for segregation into self-restrictive urban, village, and tribal communities. Each such community has been affected anthropometrically in proportion to its contact with peoples of differing ethnic origins. Roughly 69% of Iraq's Christians live in the liwā's of Kirkūk, Erbil, and Mosul, with a concentration in Mosul city and in the many agricultural villages that surround it. The Christian population in central and southern Iraq is localized largely in the cities, with Baghdad and Basra as the chief centers. A significant proportion of the south Iraq Christians are Armenians who as city dwellers account for about 12,000 of the population of these centers.

The Assyrians or Nestorians are Semitic-Mediterranean natives of the northern Iraqi plains who sought refuge in the mountainous area south and east of Lake Van in Turkey following the savage Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries A.D. During their sojourn in Turkey they became brachycephalic through local admixture, but their characteristic Mediterranean facial features remained despite strong Armenoid influence.

The 30,000 Nestorian Assyrians estimated to be in Iraq in 1947 were located mainly in 'Amādīya, Ruwāndiz, and in villages in the Mosul liwā'. During the period of the Mandate their chief occupation was that of professional soldier under British command. With the disbanding of the Levies (mercenaries) they have returned to primary dependence on agriculture, but considerable numbers of men find urban employment as domestic servants and clerks in hotels, foreign households, and offices.

c. YEZIDIS — The Yezidis are a pagan group, though physically and linguistically they are the same as the Kurds. Because the Yezidi community of Iraq has for centuries been largely closed to intercourse with its non-Yezidi neighbors, it has taken on the character of a separate ethnic entity despite its obvious Kurdish descent. The Yezidis are estimated to number 15,000 and their chief areas of concentration are in Jabal Sinjar and in the plains extending northeast and northwest from Mosul, northward to the foothills of Dohuk. Their religious center is at Lalesh (Sheikh 'Ādi) 30 miles northeast of Mosul.

d. MANDAEANS — Also called Sabians or *Subbis*, the Mandaeans are likewise a pagan group and differ from other Iraqi groups in religion, language, and physical characteristics. They are distinguished by pronounced hirsuteness among the men; they are mesocephalic, and their physical and morphological affinities lean more toward those of the peoples of Iran than Iraq. A group of typical Mandaean men is shown in FIGURE 42–5D. The present number hardly exceeds 5,000 persons, the great majority of whom live in the middle and lower Iraq. Their centers are at 'Amāra and Suq ash

Shuyūkh. The Mandaeans are primarily occupied as metalworkers and boatbuilders.

e. IRANIANS — Estimates of the number of individuals resident in Iraq who are Iranians by nationality or recent derivation range up to 80,000, but it is probable that the total is closer to 40,000, exclusive of the large numbers of transients on pilgrimage. A limited number live in scattered villages on the Iranian frontier south of the Kurdish area. The majority, however, are to be found in the cities of Khānaqīn, Karbalā, and An Najaf, with lesser numbers in Baghdad, Basra, Al Kādhimain and Sāmarrā. For Iranian physical characteristics see NIS 33, SECTION 42.

C. Cultural characteristics

1. Language

a. ARABIC — Iraq's linguistic history has been dominated from early times by the Semitic family of languages, despite periodic incursions of non-Semites from the north and east and the cultural dominance of the non-Semitic Sumerians until about 1500 B.C. Babylonian, Assyrian, and Neo-Babylonian, the languages which established the linguistic pattern of ancient Iraq, were all variants and developments of the same basic Akkadian Semitic speech. The successor to these dialects was Aramaic, another Semitic tongue, which from the Achaemenid Empire in the fifth century B.C. to the Arab conquest in the seventh century A.D. was the *lingua franca* of most of the Near East. At the same time an Aramaic dialect, Syriac, was in popular use in the non-Kurdish areas of the north and northwest. Arabic, the official language of present-day Iraq, came from the Arabian Peninsula as an essential accompaniment to militant Islam, and by the end of the twelfth century A.D. it had succeeded in replacing all but isolated pockets of the other Semitic dialects in Iraq.

The modern Arabic of Iraq closely resembles the nomad dialect of Central Arabia. Internal dialectical differences exist, owing to the prevalence in northern and central Iraq of loan words from Kurdish and Turkish and to the differing Arab origins of the various speech communities. The differences, however, are nowhere great enough to interfere materially with verbal communication.

Arabic in its colloquial form has evolved since the early days of Islam, becoming simpler in grammar and more varied in vocabulary in accordance with modern needs. Classical Arabic, however, as the language in which the Koran was "divinely revealed", is still considered by the cleric, the scholar of the old school, and by the educated man in general as the only truly correct medium for formal public utterances and is frequently so used at the expense of full public comprehension.

As a written language Arabic is mutually understandable throughout the literate Arab world, and is thus, despite dialectical differences, a force for unity and common understanding, not only within Iraq but throughout the Islamic world. The cursive or *naskhi* script is used exclusively today, serving both for manuscript and printed copy.

Arabic is the sole language of southern, central, and western Iraq, except in occasional Mandaean villages in the river valleys and scattered Kurdish- or Persian-speaking communities on the southeastern frontier and in the Shiah holy cities. The northern and eastern limits of Arabic correspond theoretically to the ethnic and religious frontier presented by the Turkoman, Christian, and Kurdish communities of upper Iraq (see FIGURE 42–2). Actually, Arabic as the official language and as the language of international Near Eastern trade is understood far beyond these limits, by many in all cities and by some few in practically all settlements up to the fastness of the Kurdish mountains.

The number of persons claiming Arabic as their primary language is estimated to be approximately 3,568,000 or 74% of the total population.

b. KURDISH — Linguistically Kurdish is a member of the Indo-European family. More specifically it is West Iranian although it is clearly distinct from modern Persian, and verbal communication between speakers of Kurdish and Iranian, though possible, is difficult. It bears no linguistic relationship to Arabic, Turkomani, or Neo-Syriac, except through the use of loan words acquired through long periods of contiguity.

The Kurdish of Iraq is divided into numerous dialects which, because of the isolation of the various tribes, tend to become increasingly distinct one from the other and even mutually unintelligible. Their number, location, and interrelationship are far from clear. The predominant dialect in Iraq is Kurmanji. East Kurmanji predominates east and south of the Great Zab, with Sorani as its chief subdialect. Sulaimani, a further subdivision of Sorani, is the language of the little Kurdish literature Iraqi Kurdistan has produced and is closer to being an "official" language than any of the other Kurdish dialects. West Kurmanji predominates west and north of the Great Zab and extends beyond the boundaries of Iraq. Bohtani is its principal subdialect. The only example of Iranian Kurdish spoken in the country, distinct from Kurmanji, is Gūrāni, which is found in the southernmost tip of Iraqi Kurdistan and among such heterodox groups as the Kāka'i and the Shabak. None of the dialects can be precisely delimited geographically, since the tribes concerned are often migratory and not infrequently change their migratory range. There are also no data on which may be estimated the numbers of individuals speaking the separate

dialects, though a total of approximately 807,000 Kurds live in Iraq. The amount of bi-lingualism among them is small, for the Kurds exhibit a notable resistance to linguistic assimilation. Arabic is the most commonly understood "foreign" language, though even that is restricted to urban and official centers. Persian is understood to a limited extent by those few Kurds who annually migrate far enough into Iran to get beyond that country's own Kurdish-speaking belt.

c. TURKOMANI — While the Turkomans of modern Iraq are descendants of Seljuk Turks who invaded Iraq in the twelfth century A.D., the difference between their language and that spoken in Turkey today (see NIS 27, SECTION 42) is slight. Both are mutually intelligible, and dialectical differences between the various Turkoman villages within Iraq are insignificant. The language has little or no written literature. Approximately 50,000 Iraqis are Turkomani-speaking, living in villages extending from the Syrian-Turkish border northwest of Mosul to Mandalī. Arabic is widely understood among them since the Turkoman community merges with the Arabic-speaking areas to the west.

Prior to World War I modern Osmanli Turkish was the chief secondary language of Iraq, a knowledge thereof being an essential prerequisite for anyone with ambitions in government or professional life. But since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of an independent Iraqi state, Turkish has lost its importance, and the number of those who speak it is constantly diminishing.

d. OTHERS

(1) *Persian* — Persian is the primary language of approximately 40,000 persons in Iraq. The accretion of Iranians around the Shiah shrine cities of Iraq and the business connected with the local pilgrim traffic account for the presence of the majority of Persian-speaking Iraqis. Arabic is widely understood among this group.

(2) *Armenian* — Approximately 12,000 Armenian-speaking Iraqis are to be found in the urban centers, chiefly Baghdad and Basra. Of these the great majority are equally fluent in Arabic and Turkish.

(3) *Syriac* — Neo-Syriac is spoken in several variations among the Christian sects which center upon the city of Mosul. Though these dialects are Semitic and therefore related to Arabic the differences are too great for mutual understandability. However, Arabic can generally be understood by at least some few in each village. An accurate estimate of the total number of Neo-Syriac-speaking individuals is difficult. East Syriac is spoken by the 30,000 Assyrians and the 98,000 Chaldeans estimated to be in Iraq. West Syriac is the language of the Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, estimated at approximately 12,000 and 25,000, respectively.

(4) *Mandaean* — A dialect descendant from the pre-Islamic Aramaic of Iraq is spoken by the Mandaeans, approximately 5,000 of whom inhabit the middle and lower Tigris-Euphrates valley. Equal proficiency in Arabic makes them entirely bi-lingual.

(5) *English* — English is the most widely understood of all European languages in Iraq. The physical presence of British nationals—as occupying troops in World War I, as officials during the Mandate, and today as governmental advisers and businessmen—has had a strong effect on the spread of the language. Knowledge of English has been further augmented by the compulsory study of English in the public schools, the presence of advanced Iraqi students at the American University of Beirut and at universities in the United States and Great Britain, the influence of the British administration of the oil fields, and the use of Iraq as an Allied depot during World War II. An estimate of the numbers who have a useful understanding of English is impossible, but there are few centers of trade or government where the English-speaking foreigner could not find someone with whom he could communicate.

(6) *French* — A limited number of Iraqis claim French as a secondary language. The number, though indefinite, is small and is made up chiefly of Jews who have qualified for French certificates in their schools, and of graduates of various French-sponsored missionary schools.

2. Social structure

a. CLASS STRATIFICATION

(1) *General* — The stratification of society in Iraq is multiplied and complex. Not only are there the usual horizontal divisions based on socio-economic distinctions, but also vertical divisions cutting across these, which stem from racial, religious, and linguistic differences.

(2) *Racial*

(a) ARABS — In the broadest sense the term Arab refers to all Iraqis for whom Arabic is the primary language, exclusive of the Jews. In social practice, however, it excludes Arabic-speaking Christians, who even though ethnically the same as other Arabs are excluded because of their religious differentiation. The chief subdivisions among Arabs consist of the two great groups, tribal and non-tribal.

Among the tribal group the Bedouin, the true nomads, consider themselves to be the aristocracy. In fact, there is among Arab Iraqis as a whole so strong a tradition of the heroic days of their desert past that this claim would seldom be challenged.

Among the non-Bedouin tribes, which comprise by far the majority of tribal Arabs, social differentiation is similarly apt to be based on historical importance, lineage, size, military prowess, wealth, etc.

Nontribal Arabs are those whose tribal connections are so far in the past as to be either abandoned or forgotten. They are largely urban and range from humble laborers to leaders in government. The divisive factors in this important group are limited to the socio-economic and the religious.

The Arabs of Iraq raise no color bar against the country's few Negroes. Negro blood, however, is looked upon unfavorably by the Bedouin, with their emphasis on purity of descent, to the same degree as other outside strains.

(b) KURDS — The Kurds as a non-Arab people are divided from the majority of the population of Iraq by an ethnic difference. Other factors, such as a well-defined and isolated habitat and a different language, serve to reinforce their separateness from the Arab majority. This is further accentuated by the fringe of Syriac- and Turkish speaking groups which cushion the Kurds from direct Arab contact along the greater part of the Kurdish-Arab boundary. Tribal division among the Kurds in most cases is precise and emphatic and is perpetuated by the isolation of one group from another inherent in their rugged environment. This sense of intense tribal independence is a powerful deterrent to any united Kurdish action. Being fighting men by avocation, if not strictly by profession, prowess in arms is one of the chief criteria of superiority among tribes and families.

(c) OTHERS — Iraqis who are of recent derivation from another nationality or ethnic family, such as those of Iranian or Armenian origin, form natural ethnic subdivisions within the total population. Since such groups are differentiated further by deviation in language, and often in religion, their separateness from the remainder is correspondingly greater. The Turkomans, while not differentiated from the norm by religion, find that their ethnic and linguistic deviation is more than enough to keep them as a group apart from their Arab and Kurdish neighbors. The Assyrians and the Jews may legitimately be considered as ethnic variants from the majority Arab population pattern, and for that reason also a group apart. However, since religion is the dominating divisive factor in both cases they will be discussed below under religious distinction.

(3) *Linguistic* — Each of the languages and dialects native to Iraq is a sign and a source of class differentiation within the country, and each fortifies the religious, ethnic, and economic differences that in varying degrees distinguish one group from the other. Thus all speakers of languages other than the dominant Arabic are individually set apart from that group, accentuating at the same time such differences as may already exist through divergence in race, religion, or economic status.

Social superiority is claimed by the Arabic-speaking majority, who think of Iraq as an Arab country. This attitude of superiority is held by the Arabic-speaking component both as a class and as individuals.

In recognition of the linguistic differences in northern Iraq, and in execution of the provisions of the Mandate relating to minorities, concessions have been made legalizing the use of Kurdish and Turkomani for the internal administration and courts in those *qadā's* (districts) where these languages predominate (see FIGURE 42–3). Moreover, the Kurdish-speaking qadā's of Mosul liwā', which is outside the predominating Sorani dialect area (Kirkūk, Sulaimānīya, and Erbil liwā's), may choose their own particular dialects for official use. The right of trial in Arabic is guaranteed to all Arabic-speaking litigants, while the schools are conducted in Kurdish, Turkomani, or Arabic in accordance with local majority usage. The official language for local internal administration shown in FIGURE 42–3 reverts to Arabic for technical departments and for communication with higher authority.

FIGURE 42–3. IRAQI QADĀ'S (DISTRICTS) OF NORTHERN LIWĀ'S DESIGNATED FOR OFFICIAL USE OF KURDISH AND TURKOMANI LANGUAGES *

LIWĀ' (PROVINCE)	OFFICIAL LANGUAGE		LANGUAGE OF THE COURTS	
	Quadā's using Kurdish	Quadā's using Kurdish and Turkomani	Quadā's using Kurdish	Quadā's using Kurdish, Turkomani or Arabic
Mosul	'Amādīya 'Aqra Dohuk Zakho Zibār		'Amādīya 'Aqra Zakho Zibār	Dohuk Shaikhān
Erbil	Erbil Köi Sanjaq Makhmūr Rānia Ruwāndiz		Köi Sanjaq Rānia Ruwāndiz	Erbil Makhmūr
Kirkūk	Chemchemāl	Kifrī	Chemchemāl	Kifrī
Sulaimānīya	Dāqūq Halabja Shahrbāzār Sulaimānīya	Kirkūk	Dāqūq Halabja Shahrbāzār Sulaimānīya	Kirkūk

* According to Local Languages Law, No. 74 of 1931.

(4) *Religious*

(a) GENERAL — Of the several factors in Iraq that contribute to social distinction, none is so positive, so sharply defined, and so closely observed, as religion. It is in general a more powerful factor toward separateness, and unity within the separate divisions, than either race, language, or economic status, since it has often been synonymous with national or political importance.

Iraq's preponderantly peasant population still adheres fiercely to the conventions of religion, and its religious convictions are deep-rooted and sincere though seldom fully understood. To these people religion is the dominating cultural influence in life. Deviation from the group pattern affects their opportunities for earning a living and thus is avoided for practical as well as doctrinal reasons.

(b) ISLAM — As the state religion and the traditional faith of the Arab peoples, Islam is dominant over all other schools of religious thought in Iraq. Islam itself emphasizes its superiority over other religions, and Muslim Iraqis have no doubt of their social and doctrinal superiority, today as in the past. To them adherents of all other faiths are peoples apart.

Islam, however, is itself divided into mutually antagonistic sects. The dominant Sunni and Shiah sects comprise the most conspicuous internal division. While the Shiah are in the majority, the Sunnis traditionally control the government (SECTION 43, under Religion). Thus the pinch of political, hence economic, inferiority is felt by the Shiah, accentuating the differences already created by doctrine and Shiah religious zeal. Lesser sects within Islam tend also to be mutually antipathetic, but the numbers involved are small and the effect on the whole social pattern is correspondingly less pronounced.

While it is true that the Muslims in Iraq, as elsewhere, are beset by denominational differences, the power of Islam as a latent unifying force in times of emergency still exists, as shown in the willingness of Iraqi Muslim Arabs to support the Palestine war regardless of differences in creed.

(c) CHRISTIANITY — The influence of Christianity in Iraq is vitiated by excessive sectarianism. Thus, not only are the Christian sects looked upon by the Muslim majority as a people apart, but the various Christian denominations also look upon each other with mutual suspicion. This differentiation from the majority also takes on a geographical overtone, since the great bulk of native Christians are found in the vicinity of Mosul city.

(d) JUDAISM — The position of the Jews in Iraq paralleled that of the Christians in regard to its separateness from and degree of tolerance by the Muslim majority prior to the Palestine war. Since that conflict the isolation of the Jewish community from contact with the Muslims has been intensified, and the tolerance with which they were formerly accepted by the Muslims has changed to bitter antagonism. There is no prospect in the immediate future of an easing of the sharp lines of distinction isolating the Iraqi Jews from the remainder of the population.

(e) OTHERS — The same separateness from the majority that characterizes the Christians exists in equal or intensified form with the lesser religions. The fact that the Mandaeans are accorded a position of tolerance on a par with that traditionally accorded to the native Christians and Jews, or that the Yezidis are despised by the Muslims, does not alter the pattern of social differentiation based on religion. Even among the Yezidis the distaste with which they are viewed by their Muslim neighbors is merely an accentuation of the vertical distinction and has little effect on the individual's opportunity to rise to a higher horizontal or socio-economic level. The Yezidis, on their part, fully reciprocate this Muslim antipathy and have resisted by force efforts of the Baghdad Government to recruit them into the army where they would be obliged to live in close contact with Muslims. Iraqi Yezidis, on the other hand, have willingly served in Christian forces in Syria under French command.

(5) *Socio-economic* — In common with neighboring Arab states, Iraq presents a picture of sharp contrast between economic groups. The rich by local standards are very rich and the poor by any standards live in great poverty. The middle class is relatively small and has only recently begun to play a part in influencing public affairs. Opportunities for change from one economic level to another are strictly limited. The laborer's or peasant's inability to accumulate capital in money or produce beyond that needed for subsistence holds him effectively within his class.

The middle class is made up largely of small merchants, traders, clerks, lesser government officials, professional men, and the various white-collar occupations of metropolitan commerce. A very considerable portion in the past were Jews. They made up a majority of the metropolitan merchants, controlled the import and export business, and had a strong hold on such professions as private banking, money changing, and goldsmithing. With the restrictions and boycott imposed upon the Jews as a result of the Palestine war this substantial segment of the middle class has been gradually liquidating its assets and emigrating to Israel without any clear picture yet emerging as to the character of its replacement. Opportunities for rise to the upper class exist, but occurrences are

relatively rare, not because of a lack of enterprise but because the upper class retain within their own group the greater opportunities for profit.

The upper class in Iraq represents the continuation of feudal and tribal overlordship into present-day life. Its members govern Iraq, fill its high administrative posts, sit in Parliament, and control such native big business as the country affords. This class is composed of the tribal sheikhs, the sheikhs-turned-landlord, the water monopolist, the plantation owner, the cleric, the military leader, and the politician. The Sunni Arabs maintain their dominance in this stratum of society, and except for the Shiah Muslims there is little competition from other ethnic or religious groups. Straddling all classes, but affecting mainly the middle and upper class groups, are the government employees, who, as representatives or the governing bureaucracy, are considered as a group apart by the general mass of the people. The cleavage resulting from this antagonism between the governors and the governed is social as well as political.

Despite the extremes of wealth, class consciousness in Iraq based on economic status does not compare with religion, race, tribe, or language as a divisive factor. The patriarchal concept of leadership in Iraq is still pronounced. The leader is the recognized head of the family and, as a feudal lord with responsibilities, deals with those under him as true or nominal members of his family. Contributing to this concept is the Muslim acceptance of the fixed and traditional social order in preference to change.

(6) *Trends* — Minor changes, both vertical and horizontal, can be expected in the various classes discussed above. It is anticipated that the present trend among the Bedouin toward a settled life will continue at a pace proportionate to the availability of arable land for homesteading. With improved communications and the increase in radio transmissions the area in which Arabic is understood probably will expand steadily. With the increased opportunities for education (see SECTION 43, under Education) a continuance of the gradual increase in the numbers and importance of the middle class can also be expected. Among the religious communities, the proportion of Jews in relation to other religious groups is being diminished by the continuing exodus of Iraqi Jews to Israel. Within Islam little change in number is anticipated, though the impact of western pragmatism can be expected to have a continued dampening effect on religious observance among upper-class Muslims.

The political implications of the various classes are complex. Arab Muslims are capable of acting as a unit in a national emergency, as demonstrated in the Palestine war, but in other matters they are seriously split between conservative, ruling Sunnis and the zealous "have not" Shiah. The Sunni controlling party leans toward international cooperation, with a more tolerant view of the traditional British interest in Iraq than their Shiah counterparts. The Kurds, while predominantly Sunni, are more influenced in their actions by what will benefit their specific group than by any bonds of common sectarianism. Long the stalwart supporters of British policy in the hope of an independent Kurdistan, the Kurds are presently a disillusioned minority receptive to Soviet propaganda which is also directed toward the two other large "have not" groups, the Shiah and industrial labor. The Jews, once a powerful minority in politics, no longer are an influential factor. The Christians, the Yezidis, and other minor religions and sects, motivated by their traditional fear of extinction by Arab Islam, are interested primarily in preserving their own cultural identity. Their attitude, like that of the Kurds, is essentially anti-Arab rather than anti-Iraq. This lack of national solidarity, the inability of the government to make its separate groups feel as one family rather than as unrelated antagonists, indicates the essential instability of Iraq's national structure. Sincere unity of effort in a national emergency could not be expected except among the Muslim Arabs.

b. SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS — In Iraq, the individual's desire for group membership finds expression through identification with a religious body. His informal patronage of the local coffee house, which provides the atmosphere of a club, is evidence of a similar desire. There are no large-scale social movements in Iraq, but numerous small social and business organizations do exist. Iraq's limited labor organizations are discussed in SECTION 44. Other small associations center their interest in athletics, science, the arts, and education. Youth groups, organized mainly along ethnic or religious lines, include the YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association) in Baghdad and Mosul and the YMMA (Young Muslim Men's Association) in Baghdad, but even these lack vitality. Secret societies are of no importance, although there is a Babylon Lodge of Masons with a small membership in Baghdad.

Most religious groups, including minority communities such as the Armenians, Chaldeans, Syrian Orthodox, and Jews, have their own charitable societies. The largest organized charity among Muslims is the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, a member of the League of Red Cross Societies. Organized in 1932 to raise money for the support of charities in Iraq and neighboring countries, the Society now has 350 members, almost all of whom are upper-class Iraqis without professional training in welfare work. The Society receives some finan-

cial aid from the government and in addition raises funds privately for support of its child welfare and home nursing program. It also furnishes aid in emergencies, as in the 1950 floods, but it does not engage in rehabilitation work. In 1945 the Women's Branch of the Red Crescent Society, in conjunction with other smaller women's societies, formed the Iraqi Women's Union to work with women's organizations in other Arab countries and with international organizations such as the United Nations.

Most larger Iraqi cities have a Chamber of Commerce, but the most important of the numerous professional and trade associations in Iraq is the quasi-official Iraqi Date Association, centered in Basra (see CHAPTER VI, SECTION 65, under Foreign trade).

Cooperative enterprises are not widespread in Iraq. Approximately 20, including an agricultural association among the Dujaila homesteaders, were registered in 1949. Most cooperative groups are consumers' cooperatives such as the Consumers' Cooperative Association in Basra, which by February 1948 had only 1,746 members, three stores, and a capital of 2700 Iraqi dinars.

3. Pattern of living

a. GENERAL — The Muslim Arabs are the overwhelming majority and can be considered to represent a regional norm from which the different minorities may deviate to a greater or lesser degree. Factors relating exclusively to other ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups will be cited where pertinent.

b. BIRTH, MARRIAGE, DEATH — To the Muslim Arabs of Iraq the prospect of survival for a newborn child is too uncertain to have fostered the growth of any special festivities connected with birth. The common belief is that its eventual survival is more in the hands of Allah than in those of its parents. Male offspring are preferred to female, since the continuity of the family line or lineage is dependent on male progeny. Male members of a family, moreover, are a greater economic asset as providers than female, and are symbols of a family's strength. Births are attended by the local midwife, who in all but the most remote districts has by now received some degree of government-sponsored instruction in hygiene. Registration at the time of birth is indifferently observed, with the consequence that few rural children know their exact ages. Circumcision of male children is universal regardless of religion and is the occasion for the only festival connected with the child's growth. Children, boys and girls alike, are brought up by the women of the family, with the man taking little active part in the growth and discipline of his offspring. There is no fixed age at which a boy is accepted into adult society, but there are few among the great peasant majority who are not bearing their full share in the economic and religious life of their communities by the time they reach their fourteenth year.

Marriage throughout Iraq is accompanied by a business agreement on the price of the bride. The choice of the bride is usually considered a family affair. According to Arab custom, the girl's first cousin on the paternal side, has the first choice of her hand. Marriage within the kinship group tends to reinforce family solidarity, and is the basis of clan and tribal organization. Marriage outside the range of kinship also takes place, and is often performed in order to widen and strengthen the circle of those related by blood. Young girls may even be given in marriage in the settlement of feuds. The choice of the bride is usually left to the bridegroom's mother and sisters, the bridegroom staying aloof except to select the family or clan from which a choice may be made and to have the final say in the spirited bargaining that precedes each betrothal. The bride price varies in accordance with the degree of kinship and other factors. The marriage ceremony itself is the occasion of elaborate and costly entertainment. Contrary to occidental custom, it is the groom rather than the bride's family who bears the expense of the festivities. The groom's mother is the chief feminine member of the family during her lifetime.

Among the Muslims polygamy is permitted but is more the exception than the rule. Lower-class men cannot afford the expense and the upper classes tend toward monogamy as being more in harmony with the Westernized social pattern of the modern educated Iraqi. The well-to-do middle class is the remaining stronghold of polygamy. Divorce under Islam technically is easy, but it also is a luxury most available to the wealthy, since it involves the return of the dowry and a renegotiation of the often involved financial agreement entered into at the time of marriage. Divorce among Iraqi Christians is practically nonexistent.

Death with Iraqi Muslims is followed by immediate ceremonial washing of the body, its encasement in a winding sheet, and burial, the body lying on the left side facing Mecca. Special days are set aside, such as the seventh or fortieth days after death, for friends to congregate at the home of the deceased to feast and lament his passing. Among the Shiah great merit accrues from burial at Karbalā or An Najaf, and families will sometimes save for years until they can afford reinterment of the head of the household at one of the shrine cities. Lesser shrines also collect their communities of dead about them (see photo in this Chapter, SECTION 43, of the cemetery surrounding the tomb of Sheikh Ma'rūf al-Karkhi). Among the Bedouin

and peasants natural promontories and mounds marking the sites of ancient cities are customary burial places.

c. STATUS OF WOMEN — Tradition stemming from antiquity and legalized by Islam (see NIS 53, CHAPTER IV, SECTION 43, under Religion) relegates woman in Iraq to a position unequivocably secondary to that occupied by man. While she has legal rights and can inherit and own property, to enforce those rights in legal disputes the Muslim woman must always be represented by a male relative.

Family life is patriarchal. The status of wife is one of subservience to her husband, although she has a large measure of authority and responsibility in purely domestic affairs. Though polygamy is not as prevalent as formerly, the veil and seclusion in the harem, sanctioned but not demanded by Islam, are still predominant among urban Muslim women in Iraq. Except within the family circle men and women do not meet socially.

Confined to the home and largely uneducated (see SECTION 43, under Education), the average Muslim woman remains inexperienced and uninformed. At the same time she has almost complete responsibility for the health and upbringing of her children, whose training is apt to be characterized by ignorance and superstition.

There is no veiling and little seclusion among the Bedouin and the peasants. Polygamy among the Bedouin is not infrequent, and the wife's status, in spite of her apparent freedom, remains inferior to that of her husband.

In contrast to Arab custom Kurdish women, though Muslims, move about with freedom among men outside the family circle; Christian wives may on occasion join their husbands at social functions; and Jewish women who formerly veiled have dropped the custom more quickly than have the Muslims.

Contact with the West and travel abroad have begun to break down many of the old prejudices in regard to women in Iraq. The spread of girls' schools has awakened a desire for liberalization among the younger women of Iraq. Muslim women of the older generation and of the more conservative social groups, however, do not object to seclusion which they consider a sign of respect on the part of their husbands or parents.

d. RELIGION — To the great mass of illiterate, impoverished peasantry that are the bone and body of the Iraq nation, Islam has still much of the compelling quality that characterized its days of conquest. The name of Allah constantly recurs in their everyday speech in forms which, though they now have become part of everyone's working vocabulary, still retain their flavor of original piety. Islam among these very poor is at one time both a rationalization of their present status and a solace for ever-present hardship. It offers them also a common cause and interest, and an opportunity to identify themselves, even though remotely, with the conquests and achievements of Islam's early days.

The unifying value of Islam in Iraq is severely restricted. While it identifies the individual with a world-wide body, its power to overcome racial and interdenominational antagonisms is problematical. The Kurds, for example, are devout Muslims, but their traditional antagonism to the Arabs was too strong to permit them to give more than lip service to the Iraqi-Arab plea for united effort in behalf of their co-religionists in the Palestine war. Within Islam dissension between sects is epitomized by the intolerance with which the Shiah view the more moderate Sunni sect and the lesser groups within the Muslim world. The Shiah, at the same time, remain more closely tied to the prescriptions of the faith than do the Sunnis.

The Iraqi city dwellers as a whole show an increasing laxity in the observance of religious laws due to a process of secularization, which has become pronounced since World War I. To them Islam has lost its position of autocratic authority over social conduct, and its influence as a moral and ethical guide is on the decline. The obligation of personal and congregational prayer is widely disregarded, as are the requirements for the observance of the fast of Ramadan and the obligation of pilgrimage to Mecca. Neither are such Koranic prohibitions as those against pork and alcohol observed with any regularity or sincerity. Only such elemental dictates as are religious by adoption such as circumcision, are strictly adhered to.

The stalwarts of religious observance in Iraq are the great peasant majority. They are the ones who are faithful in daily prayer and who most fully keep the daytime fast required during the month of Ramadan. Their observance of the rules and superstitions accepted by and expected of the faithful, while not always complete, at least is more universal than that of any other group. The pilgrimage to Mecca, for example, is beyond the means, if not the dreams, of most peasants, but in compensation there are few local shrines regardless of faith or nature that do not receive the steady patronage of Muslim men and women in spiritual or physical need. The Bedouin, while fiercely maintaining their belief in Allah, in the prescriptions of the Koran, and in the mission of Muhammad, observe with characteristic independence only such rites as they please. (For Islam as an established institution, see SECTION 43, under Religion.)

The Christian population nullifies through intense sectarianism the power that it could wield as a solid bloc. Each denomination, while fervent in its Christianity, is dogged in its determination

to preserve its own identity and independence against all other faiths and sects. This separation of the various Christian sects is not purely a denominational conflict but is in most cases a further accentuation of differences that are also ethnic, tribal, and linguistic.

The same separation that distinguishes the Christians from the Muslim majority also can be cited for the remaining minor sects – Jews, Yezidis, Mandaeans, etc. Each molds the actions of its members in accordance with its special customs, and each jealously guards its independence and existence from submersion in the surrounding majority.

e. BUSINESS LIFE — The pastoral and agricultural life that comprises the chief business activity of the peasant majority is described in SECTION 44 (Labor) of this Chapter and SECTION 61 (Agriculture) of CHAPTER VI.

The business life of the typical Iraqi merchant and artisan is built around the family, the sons and nephews learning the business through actual participation as apprentices. Thus businesses in the vast majority of cases are individual, specialized, and small. Shops and workshops cling to the traditional, shallow stall regardless of whether they be in a covered bazaar or along an open street (see FIGURE 42–5A). The few larger stores in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul describing themselves as "department stores" fall far below even the standards established in Lebanon and Egypt. Purchases in all but the most Westernized shops follow the same traditional pattern – sceptical scrutiny, animated bargaining, and sudden settlement.

Larger business establishments – banks, export-import companies, insurance offices, etc. – present a more occidental appearance, but the leisurely pace and the atmosphere of indolent confusion is still in the spirit of the bazaar stall. The very few factories that can be classed as Iraqi share these same characteristics. Only the large Western-owned companies approximate occidental standards of efficiency and even that is slowed in pace in conformity with national custom.

The most striking characteristic of Iraqi business is its static, nonaggressive character. Business thinking is in terms of the small merchandiser, the maintenance of whose established trade is more important than possible growth.

f. SOCIAL LIFE — The use to which the Iraqi puts his leisure time varies little throughout the country regardless of locality, race, or faith. Among the tribal Arabs and Kurds the sheikhs or *āghas* hold open house for all men who come to their door. The facilities for their hospitality are in proportion to their wealth, ranging from humble mud-brick quarters of the settled minor tribal sheikh to the great black tents of the important Bedouins (see FIGURE 42–4B). Hospitality is accompanied by customary observances regardless of surroundings, i.e., a seat near the host in relation to the guest's importance and among the Bedouin, bitter black coffee, while in localities farther removed from the desert and the mountains, coffee plain or spiced, or even overly sweetened tea. Conversation is animated or desultory, or even replaced by long lapses of silence, as the mood dictates. In villages and cities where the tribal customs have been discarded, the coffee house takes over as the chief place of public recreation and discussion (see FIGURE 42–5C; see also photograph of coffee house in SECTION 43). Refreshments, the nargileh or water pipe, and backgammon boards are provided for a fee, newspapers are available, and conversation in endless quantities is there for all. In settled areas coffee houses often provide radio entertainment. In recent years the cinema has offered some competition to the coffee house but as prepared entertainment rather than as social exchange. Only among the upper class, who have taken on Western customs, is there any entertainment in the home based on the occidental pattern. Even there mixed gatherings of the two sexes are extremely rare.

The most striking aspect of the social activity of the Iraqi male is the amount of leisure at his disposal during working hours. It is at the same time an apt demonstration of the more deliberate tempo of business life prevailing in Iraq.

The social life of the Iraqi woman, unlike that of the man, is centered in the home. While inconspicuous, it is hardly less extensive than that of the men and includes numerous gatherings to celebrate holidays, weddings, funerals, etc.

g. MORALITY — The morality of the Iraqi cannot be judged in the light of Western standards alone, nor solely in respect to laws which in many cases reflect Western concepts of right and wrong more closely than those of the Iraqi. Tribal and Sharia law (see this Chapter, SECTION 43, under Religion) is accepted and respected as a natural accompaniment to the Iraqi's way of life. The Iraqi's attitude toward civil law, however, is different and is conditioned by centuries of autocratic rule where laws were imposed from above rather than evolved through customary practice. Therefore, he tends to view these laws as rules to be obeyed when necessary, but to disregard them carries no stigma. Centuries of corrupt government have also left their imprint on the morality of the public official. The concept of "public servant" is extremely rare among office holders. Their positions, instead, are considered posts of privilege and opportunity in which legitimate salaries are understood to be but a portion of the ultimate recompense for high and low officials alike.

This same indifference to individual morality is paralleled by an official indifference to conditions of poverty, disease, and unemployment. Tradition deeply rooted in Iraq's tribal past makes aid to the unfortunate a family or clan responsibility rather than a public charge. Only to a limited degree has there been any public concern for the welfare of the very poor, and little effort has been made to eliminate or ameliorate the increased beggary and vagabondage following World War II.

Since the tribal tradition is weakest in the cities, the greatest amount of unameliorated need is also found there. Similarly, codes of personal honesty are lowest and incidences of theft are highest in the cities, and supplies of salable goods must constantly be guarded against pilferage. The precept "Let the buyer beware" is accepted and normal in all business transactions to a degree well beyond that customary in the United States. Yet a code of personal honor does exist through which the pledged word becomes morally more binding than a legally executed contract.

Supply depots in desert or Kurdish areas must be protected from organized tribal raids. Tribal law, which still exerts a strong influence on all Iraqis, has its own set of moral values. Tribal feuds are accepted as part of the normal pattern of desert life, with intertribal murder and raids demanding satisfaction in blood or in payment of goods or women.

Sexual morality is entirely one-sided. Promiscuity by the man carries with it no reproach; but even the suspicion of scandal on the part of the woman is grounds for her murder by father, brother, or husband, with little likelihood of anything more than token punishment under the law.

h. APPEARANCE — In addition to the physical characteristics of various ethnic groups described above in Subsection B, individual differences of dress distinguish certain racial, social, and religious groups from each other. Headgear, as elsewhere in the Near East, is a distinctive article of dress and one by which the wearer's nationality, social status, or ethnic affiliation may often be determined. The urban Iraqi man of the middle and upper classes has adopted occidental dress exclusively, except for the hat, which is regarded as the badge of the Westerner. The *sidārah,* a sort of overseas cap introduced during the Mandate as a form of national dress, is now seldom used, men preferring to go bareheaded. The fez, the usual headdress of the upper classes during the Turkish regime, is today in almost complete discard. The urban lower classes still cling to such remnants of native dress as are convenient and at hand (see FIGURES 42–4D and 42–5A). Differences of race or religion distinguishable by dress among the upper and middle classes have largely disappeared; the cleric is inclined to yield more slowly, as are also the Mandaeans, who affect a modified Bedouin dress (see FIGURE 42–11). Urban women of the middle and upper classes also have adopted occidental dress, but custom demands still that in public they be well and discreetly covered, with the face either partially hidden by their cloak or by the traditional veil.

Bedouin and other non-urban Arabs retain their traditional dress with individual variations (see FIGURES 42–4A, 42–4B, and 42–4D). Characteristic is the head cloth held in place by the woolen fillet or *'aqāl.* As a protection against direct sun, intense reflection, wind, and blowing sand it can hardly be equaled. A long cotton gown or shirt, with or without baggy trousers underneath, sandals, and a heavy sleeveless cloak, or *aba,* complete the essential features of their costume. Added refinements such as the dagger or the long or short coat beneath the aba are a measure of the wearer's economic status. Bedouin women dress in enveloping layers of black but are not required to wear the veil or otherwise to cover their faces.

The second major rural pattern of dress is that affected by the Kurds (see FIGURE 42–4D). Essentially, it consists of loose-fitting trousers, shirt with exaggeratedly long sleeves, multiple sash, jacket, heavy cloak or aba, upturned leather slippers, skull cap, and colorful, carelessly-wound turban with fringed ends. The larger the turban the greater the personal importance of the wearer, but rich or poor consider the dagger and the rifle an essential personal requirement. As with the Bedouin, the women are unveiled and somewhat more given to color and ornamentation in their dress than are the desert dwellers. The dress of the Yezidi and the Turkoman (see FIGURE 42–5B) follows the Kurdish pattern.

i. FOOD — Bread in Iraq is truly the staff of life. It comprises the major item in the daily diet of the poor throughout the land and a very substantial portion of the upper-class diet as well. The local product is in the form of flat, leathery chapatties of unleavened wheat flour. Barley and rice flour are common adulterants during wheat shortages and in those rural areas where barley and rice are the major crops.

The average diet of the urban laborer or the peasant consists of bread and heavily sweetened tea for breakfast and supper. His midday meal would include some bread, a vegetable such as onions or radishes, and protein (if he is fortunate) in the form of meat, fish, lentils, pulses, etc. Variations in accordance with locality and means consist of rice, boiled wheat, dates, eggs, and fresh vegetables. Sheep fat or clarified butter is used for cooking, and a mainstay for protein consists of various degrees of artificially-soured ewe's or goat's milk,

ranging from a whole buttermilk, through the favorite custard-like *laban* (yoghurt), to a hard, white cheese. The food of the upper classes differs from that of the working man more in quantity than in quality, since cooking in Iraq has progressed but little beyond the stage of rustic simplicity.

The Bedouin subsist on what is perhaps the leanest diet of all the Iraqis – milk from their camels, sheep, or goats, dates, and occasional gorges on rice and meat. The working man throughout Iraq is accustomed to a lower caloric intake than the occidental. The average diet of the Basra stevedore in 1948, for example, was roughly 2,400 calories per day, and many among the peasants subsist on less.

Regional variations in the menu conform to crop concentration – dates and rice in middle and lower Iraq, citrus fruits in middle Iraq, wheat in north-central Iraq, and lettuce, tomatoes, melons, grapes, and other vegetables and fruits in abundance in the upland plains separating northeastern Iraq from Kurdistan proper.

Food taboos are limited in number. Pork is not partaken by any of the native groups, though it is expressly forbidden only to Muslims and Jews. Alcoholic beverages are also forbidden to Muslims, but it is a prohibition which is widely disregarded by the upper classes. Lesser food taboos are found among the minorities, such as the Yezidi ban on lettuce, and the Mandaean and Jewish ban on foods not ceremonially pure.

4. Artistic and intellectual expression

Life for the present-day Iraqi revolves about agriculture, business, and politics; and artistic or intellectual expressions without obvious practical benefits are viewed by the average Iraqi with indifference.

Despite a pride in the past, there are few forms of artistic expression in Iraq which are founded on national tradition. During the last 30 years a slight interest in the arts has grown among a limited circle of Baghdad sophisticates, but the techniques and standards are European and reveal neither individuality nor originality.

The visual arts, which have little place in the life of nomadic peoples, find expression in the indigenous crafts of the settled population. Most familiar among these is the silver work of the Mandaeans (FIGURE 42–5D), which follows stereotyped and traditional motifs. Potters, coppersmiths, and leather workers continue skillfully to produce by hand, following traditional patterns, the wares long in demand because of their utilitarian value. Glazed tile and brick for the decoration and repair of mosques continue to be made, though the tradition is Iranian and the artisans are of Iranian descent. In weaving there is more creative talent observable. The silk weavers of Al Kādhimain are famous for their abas, though the patterns are traditional; and the peasant weavers of northern Iraq show unusual variety and some originality in the production of their woolen fabrics. The rugs of Iraqi Kurdistan as original artistic expressions are spontaneous and of all Iraqi handicrafts the least affected by external forms, though they do not compare in workmanship with the best Persian rugs.

Iraq's architectural forms are unoriginal. Mosques continue to be built in traditional style, being patterned after those of Iran (see photograph of mosque at Al Kādhimain in this Chapter, SECTION 43). Modern government buildings are usually poor imitations of Western types (see photograph of College of Engineering at Baghdad in this Chapter, SECTION 43).

The Arab, who loves his language, most often expresses himself artistically in poetry and oratory. Declamation, all by memory, is popular among the Bedouin. There have been a few modern Iraqi poets, notably the late Ma'rūf ar-Rusāfi, who are much admired in educated circles. There are no outstanding libraries or magazines of merit in the country, and Iraqis interested in literature depend mainly on imports from Egypt and Lebanon. Among Turkomans there is no developed literature and but little more among the Kurds.

Music is similarly undeveloped. Ancient musical forms and instruments, neither of which has progressed for centuries, are still in use. Egyptian tunes made popular by the cinema are widely accepted, but there is no Iraqi music per se, nor is composing done in Iraq. The Royal Iraqi Band and a symphony orchestra in Baghdad play programs of Western classical music to limited audiences.

D. Attitudes of the people

1. General

Only a small percentage of the Iraqi population is interested in public affairs. Public opinion as such is restricted mainly to the large cities – Baghdad in particular – and is primarily a reflection of the thinking of the effendi class.

Most vocal on questions of national policy are the students, whose demonstrations influence even the otherwise indifferent urban lower classes. While an awareness of public affairs is now gradually spreading out into rural areas, the majority of peasants and tribesmen do not take an interest in politics.

Popular attitudes in Iraq are extremely difficult to assess. There are no scientific surveys of opinion, and the press, limited by rigid governmental supervision, reflects the opinions of editors and owners rather than the sentiments of the reading public. Dissident attitudes of large groups such as the Kurds are seldom published. Election

returns fail to reveal significant trends in popular thinking both because the aims of political parties are not clearly defined and because the public, convinced that elections are government-influenced, has little interest in voting.

Purely governmental attitudes toward internal and international affairs are covered in CHAPTER V, SECTION 55, under National policies. Attitudes of specific racial and ethnic groups toward one another are covered in this Chapter, under Cultural characteristics, above, and in SECTION 43 of this Chapter, under Religion.

2. Nationalist attitudes

The stress placed by Iraqi leaders on nationalism as a unifying force has had little effect in eliminating the mutual antipathies resulting from differences in religion, race, and language. As a consequence, there does not exist a clear-cut majority group in relation to which all other groups could be classified as minorities in a sociological or political sense. In the rural areas of southern Iraq loyalty is chiefly to tribe and religion. Hence there is a greater consciousness, particularly among the Shiah tribesmen, of being members of the larger Arab or Muslim world than of being citizens of the Iraqi state. In northern Iraq loyalty to the government is almost non-existent. The Assyrians profess loyalty as a matter of expediency, but most would prefer to emigrate to a Christian country. The Yezidis, with a tradition of autonomy during most of the Ottoman period, have not yet reconciled themselves to being part of a centralized state. The Kurds have a nationalism of their own aiming either at a greater degree of autonomy within the Iraqi state or an altogether independent Kurdistan made up of the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Many Kurdish nationalists would be willing, under favorable circumstances, to fight for an independent state, and even the ordinary Kurdish tribesman, with no interest in politics, desires independence as a matter of ethnic pride.

Iraqi national consciousness is strongest among the small but growing educated middle class in Baghdad and Basra. Their militantly nationalistic orientation, revealed in many demonstrations, has even awakened some national feeling in the urban lower classes in those cities. Their immediate aim is to free Iraq completely of British control. The more moderate, realizing Iraq's need for outside guidance, wish merely to choose their own advisers. On several occasions the Sunnis and Shiah have forgotten their differences long enough to join forces in this struggle against foreign domination.

Nationalism in Iraq often coincides with pan-Arabism. Pan-Arab sentiment, considerably strengthened in 1945 with the creation of the Arab League, was sufficiently widespread to unite all Muslim Arabs of Iraq in a very real sympathy with their fellow-Arabs displaced by the formation of Israel. While many nationalists want continued progress for their country along independent national lines, a sizable number look toward the incorporation of Iraq into a larger Arab state or federation.

Nationalism in Iraq is also spurred by a sense of national inferiority. Great emphasis is placed in the schools on the glories of Iraq's distant past, and any backwardness, whether justified or not, is apt to be blamed on the period of the British mandate. To bolster their national self-assurance and to bring themselves more quickly on a par with the West the middle and upper classes have eagerly adopted Western techniques where applicable to the practical aspects of life, but Western social and moral concepts have received little more than lip service since they do not coincide with long-established customs.

a. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER — The attitude of the rank and file of Iraqis toward their government ranges from apathy to dislike. There is widespread conviction that the Iraqi oligarchy rules for the benefit of its own ranks, chiefly Sunni Arab, and a general belief that the government is corrupt and inefficient. Urban laborers, unaware of higher politics, are generally anti- or pro-government in direct proportion to the cost and availability of food.

Except among the privileged classes, governmental authority is regarded as oppression. In outlying districts, where it threatens to upset time-honored practices, such as tribal feuds, it is often flouted. At the same time, in its rare moments of strength, the government wins grudging respect from Iraqis, who are accustomed by tradition to absolutist rule.

The royal house is disliked by many, particularly among the Shiah, who resent having the Sunni Hashimites imposed upon them. The present Regent is generally unpopular except among the feudal classes and the armed forces, but he gained some prestige by vigorously backing Iraq's participation in the Palestine war. Iraq's boy king is regarded with affection by those Iraqis who would not be in favor of eliminating the Hashimite house altogether.

Government officials as a class are looked upon by the mass of the people with distrust. As a result there is a cleavage, both social and political, between the governors and the governed. The inhabitants of Basra, both Sunni and Shiah, believe traditionally that Baghdad does not pay them the attention warranted by their importance to the country. In Baghdad, young, politically minded Iraqis feel keenly the lack of disinterested leader-

ship and the refusal of old-guard politicians to allow Western-educated, reform-minded men their due share in government. Youthful holders of lower positions in the Civil Service resent what they feel in some cases to be subordination to British officials.

Tribal hostility toward the government is strengthened by the deep-seated antagonism between tribesman and townsman. Urbanites, while monopolizing political offices and the civil service, tend to ignore the agricultural needs and interests of the vast bulk of Iraqis. As a result the rural Iraqi thinks of the government as an organization of persons who neither understand nor like him. The average peasant is so poor and neglected under the present government that he would welcome almost any change as preferable. On the other hand, tribal sheikhs, many of whom are extremely wealthy, resent the consistent attempts of the government to limit their power.

The minorities of northern Iraq are of necessity increasing their acceptance of governmental authority and looking to Baghdad for educational and social services. Their hostility toward the central power, however, has diminished little since 1918. The majority of Kurds feel that the Baghdad Arabs take little interest in their welfare and discriminate against them economically, socially, and educationally. The smaller minorities, while outwardly more friendly to the government, bow to it only because it is stronger than they.

Although antipathy to the government constitutes a grave internal problem and causes the ruling clique intermittent periods of anxiety, opposition elements lack the organization and cohesion to bring about a government more to their liking, or even to force through long overdue reforms. While members of the armed forces, whose loyalty, where it exists, is to the Hashimite house rather than to the government as a whole, are openly critical of governmental treatment of the military, no one officer or group of officers is believed capable of engnieering a *coup d'état*.

b. ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENT POLICIES — It is difficult even to approximate the extent of popular support for Iraqi government policies. A centralized school system, tight control of the press, and suppression of activities not favored by the regime allow the government to mould public sentiment to a certain extent; and a persistent propaganda campaign will sometimes arouse strong sympathy for a particular policy in an erstwhile apathetic populace. On the other hand, the public position on some questions, particularly in the international field, has been extreme enough to force the government against its better judgment to yield to popular pressure.

Many of the government's internal policies are decidedly unpopular. Authoritarian methods are resented particularly by the press and the better-informed public. Manipulation and dishonesty in elections are bitterly criticized by the losing parties but are otherwise taken for granted and accepted. Progressive elements are impatient with the slowness of social reforms and feel that the government is deliberately stalling in this respect.

In international affairs, the government's policies are more popular with the rank and file of Arab Iraqis, which often plays a part in shaping them. Strong feeling among Iraqi Muslim Arabs caused the government to aid Palestine Muslims more actively than it might otherwise have done and is preventing the government from considering peace negotiations with Israel. Public sentiment is also partially responsible for government refusal to re-open the Haifa pipe line, although its continued idleness has increased Iraq's financial difficulties.

Because of nationalistic pressure, the Iraqi Government is unable to maintain as close a relation with the United Kingdom as it would like. For example, in January 1948 popular riots and demonstrations against the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty (revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930) forced its rejection by the Iraqi Government and the fall of the pro-British Sālih Jabr cabinet.

Attitudes toward the government's Syro-Iraqi union policies are mixed. A great many Iraqi Arabs are interested in establishing closer relations, federation, or union with Syria. There are, however, a certain number of politically minded nationalists who mistrust any scheme of this sort as involving some British trick. Many of the middle class, such as doctors, teachers, and merchants, would not welcome the competition of Syrians, who are widely felt to be more intelligent and shrewder than Iraqis. The Shiah are also unenthusiastic over such a union since it would involve amalgamation with a state predominately Sunni in faith. Non-Arab groups are generally uneasy about a union based on a common Arab heritage. Armenians and Kurds, for example, fear that the realization of Arab union would be likely to re-introduce a harsher Arab rule over non-Arab minorities.

3. Attitude toward war and national defense

Iraqis are neither martial nor militaristic and, except in the case of Palestine, have had no desire for war. The average Iraqi is uninterested in territorial aggrandizement and is unwilling to fight for it. The Iraqi Army has no distinguished history, and the prestige of the armed forces is not high. However, years of reliance on the United Kingdom in all military matters have created a feeling of confidence in Iraq's military strength, a

confidence which is unwarranted in fact. While the wealthy ruling class favors the army as a protector of the *status quo,* the general attitude of the lower classes toward the military is one of apathy. In 1949, however, the welcome given by the Regent and government officials to army units returning from Palestine, and a governmental propaganda campaign extolling them, somewhat increased national pride in the armed forces.

Few Iraqis volunteer for army service and most, particularly among the tribes, are bitterly opposed to conscription. Army pay is so low that the soldier's family is in danger of starvation. Exemption from non-commissioned military service constitutes one of the basic reasons for the popularity of the academic secondary school.

The participation of their country in the Palestine war initially had widespread support from Iraqi Arabs although few volunteered for duty at the front. Non-Arab minorities, on the other hand, were little interested in the Palestine situation. Throughout most of the Palestine war lack of awareness of the true situation, because of censorship on military matters, generally kept civilian morale somewhat higher than that of the army. Excitement, tension, and brave words about the Arab effort in Palestine boosted public morale during the first months following May 1948. By December of that year, however, enthusiasm for the cause waned and was replaced by a widespread sense of the futility and hopelessness of the struggle. Factors such as food shortages, inflation, and martial law with its accompanying repression of civil liberties also dampened public spirit. As it became more obvious that nothing could keep Palestine for the Arabs, the Iraqis were glad to turn their attention to other matters, such as Syro-Iraqi union.

Until recently the need for national defense had little place in the Iraqi mind. The Palestine defeat, the fear of another war with Israel, as well as a growing fear of the Soivet Union, have increased governmental propaganda for and public support of a larger army.

4. Attitude toward foreign nations

In Iraq, which has a background of centuries of foreign oppression and control, nationalism most often takes the form of vociferous resentment against interference or control by foreign powers. The politically conscious Iraqis are proud of Iraq's historical and cultural traditions. Self-conscious about their technological deficiencies, they balk at paternalistic help as much as at outright exploitation. They are extremely sensitive to the superiority often displayed by foreigners in Iraq or implied by the foreign press abroad. Even legitimate criticism from foreigners is resented by Iraqis, who like to attribute their ills to a lack of complete control of their own affairs.

Not all classes or groups in Iraq, however, are antiforeign to the same degree. Some of the minorities, for example, would gladly turn to any outside power which expressed the desire to help them. For group attitudes toward foreigners see this Chapter, SECTION 43, under Religion.

a. UNITED STATES — Until 1945 the Iraqis had a great admiration for the United States. American missionaries, schools, and archaeological enterprises in Iraq, unrelated to political or economic advantage, had built up a reservoir of good will over the years. U.S. ideals of democracy, observed both on the American and the world stage, created a confidence in the United States as the one world power which would abide by the principles of right and justice. However, the consistent American support of the Zionist cause in Palestine drastically reversed Iraqi views toward the United States and was responsible for the attack on the Baghdad United States Information and Educational Exchange (USIE) headquarters in December 1947. U.S. prestige reached an even lower point following the U.S. recognition of Israel, thought by Iraqis to be both ill-timed and unwise. Iraqis, in proportion to their interest in the Palestine question, are bitter and disillusioned over what they consider to be this sacrifice of the Arabs on the altar of U.S. domestic politics. The United States, consequently, is considered the most hypocritical of nations, and is frequently accused of embarking on an imperialist program in the Middle East, using Israel as a spearhead.

Bitter hostility toward the United States had ebbed somewhat by June 1949, when public emotion over events in Palestine was no longer at fever pitch. Most United States actions in the Middle East, however, are still suspected as subterfuges to advance Zionist interests. While many Iraqi commercial elements in particular hope that President Truman's Point Four program will hasten much-needed irrigation and agricultural development projects, the more ardent nationalists are suspicious of the implications of accepting U.S. aid of any sort.

Bitterness toward the United States is reflected in the attitude of many Iraqis toward U.S. military action in Korea. While most responsible Iraqis have approved of the Security Council resolutions and their implementation, ultra-nationalists and leftist have not hesitated to label the U.S. position as imperialism. Iraqis generally consider the Korean situation as a test of strength between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the technical field the average Iraqi has long had the impression that the United States is rich and powerful, with virtually unlimited resources

of machines, weapons, and goods. Educated Iraqis consider the United States supreme in engineering, economics, mechanics, and science and despite anti-American sentiment want to acquire U.S. technological skill and U.S. products. On the other hand, certain educated groups of Iraqis encouraged in part by both the British and the French, consider Americans materialistic. American propaganda, which tends to overemphasize the technical aspect of U.S. culture, has not effectively corrected this misconception and American moving pictures have added to it.

b. UNITED KINGDOM — Except for a brief interlude during the Palestine war, the United Kingdom since 1920 has been the chief object of Iraqi xenophobia. British domination following World War I was bitterly resented in Iraq, and the resulting disillusionment and distrust has not yet been overcome despite progressive concessions on the part of the United Kingdom. Almost all politically conscious Iraqi Arabs are further antagonized by the broader issues of sterling bloc restrictions and, in sympathy with their Arab neighbors, by Anglo-Arab treaty relationships throughout the Near East.

Anti-British sentiment is unanimous except among a few small groups. Christian elements in southern Iraq, who look to the United Kingdom for support against the Muslim majority, are generally pro-British. Both the politically significant urban upper classes and the sheikhly landlords of the Middle Euphrates tribes, who have often had British help in maintaining their prosperity and privileges, are more favorably inclined toward the British than most of their fellow-Muslims.

Middle-class Arab Muslims, the vanguard of nationalism, resent any British control or influence as a limitation on Iraqi sovereignty. Many criticize the British for supporting corrupt Iraqi governments as much as they criticize those governments for accepting British support. While better-informed Iraqis realize that Iraq requires the services of foreign experts, they resent the incompetence of some of the advisers appointed by the United Kingdom. There is, further, a general feeling that British advisers place the interests of the British Commonwealth first, and even that they are all to a greater or lesser extent British agents. Suspicious of British motives, the nationalist Iraqi does not admit that British administration and tutelage have been of much benefit to Iraq.

Minorities of northern Iraq are also anti-British, but their reasons differ radically from those of the Arabs. Kurds and Assyrians feel that the British have let them down repeatedly in failing to help them against the Arab majority. The British government is further criticized for its support of the Arab Union. While both Kurds and Assyrians initially preferred to live under British political protection, they now have no confidence that the United Kingdom could or would safeguard their future.

The pro-Allied policy of the Iraqi Government of World War II which succeeded the pro-Nazi Rashid 'Ali group was due more to the presence of British troops than to any sympathy for the British or the Allied cause. Wartime supply shortages, inflation, and the black market were all attributed to the British. At the close of the war the politically conscious younger generation found another cause for bitterness against the United Kingdom in its failure to ensure an independent Arab government over all of Palestine. The United Kingdom since 1945 has lost much prestige in the eyes of the Iraqis.

In 1948 the Palestine situation decreased anti-British sentiment at the expense of the United States. The United Kingdom's friendly attitude toward the Arab cause, its supplying of arms until the UN arms embargo in mid-1948, and its delay in recognizing Israel had a favorable effect upon Iraqis. However, this gain was temporary, and by March 1949 the United Kingdom was again the most-disliked nation.

c. THE U.S.S.R. — Iraqi attitudes toward the Soviet Union are difficult to distinguish from feelings toward communism. For the extent to which communism has penetrated Iraq, see CHAPTER V, SECTION 57, under Soviet and communist subversive activities.

Soviet Russia's proximity to Iraq, its importance during World War II, and the current East-West conflict have focused Iraqi attention in its direction. When, early in 1944, the United Kingdom and the United States appeared to be acceding to Soviet demands, Iraqis were impressed with Soviet political as well as military strength. More recently, particularly since the invasion of South Korea, politically conscious Iraqis have developed an increased fear of Soviet aggression in Iraq.

For varying reasons anti-Soviet feeling, to one degree or another, is found uniformly among almost all Muslim Arabs. Only among those of the young educated group who have been pushed into the background politically and economically, and who are ready to turn to any powerful outside government promising support, are there pro-Soviet tendencies. The lower-class urban unemployed are a group containing discontented elements toward which Soviet propaganda has been directed. The upper classes, whose position would be untenable under communism, fear the Soviet Union. The middle classes see it as a possible imperialistic threat. They were further alienated by its backing of Israel, although the fact that the Soviet Union is

not a professed friend of Israel lessened resentment toward the U.S.S.R.

Conservative Muslims are influenced against the Soviet Union by religious leaders, who condemn Soviet irreligion. The principles of Islam are not easily adaptable to the communist system, and reports in the Iraqi press regarding the treatment of Soviet Muslims have turned many of the informed populace against the Soviet Union. The ordinary tribesman, who thinks of Soviet Russia as the particular enemy of Islam, is strongly anti-Soviet.

The Kurds, despite their adherence to Islam, and the Assyrians have been turning with greater frequency to the Soviet Union for encouragement in their desire for autonomy or independence. On the whole, however, Soviet propaganda, which makes lavish promises of independence, has succeeded in gaining the friendship of these groups rather than in inculcating communist ideals. Members of the Orthodox churches are also to some degree receptive to overtures from the Soviet Union (see CHAPTER V, SECTION 58, under Propaganda).

d. OTHERS — Iraqi attitudes toward states outside of the Near East, other than the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, depend to a large extent on the relations of these states to colonials or to other Muslim peoples. In the past few years the Dutch, for their Indonesian policy, and the Italians for their actions in Libya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, have been unpopular among better-informed Iraqis. Hostility toward France, which grew rapidly during the Franco-Syrian difficulties of 1945 increased in 1947 as a result of publicity by a Moroccan propaganda mission to Iraq regarding the reported lag between French reforms in the governments of her North African territories and nationalist aspirations in those areas. Furthermore, France, whose prestige has never been high in Iraq, is now disdained by many Iraqis, particularly those in the army, for its military weakness.

The defensive inferiority which Iraqis feel toward the West extends even to such states as Egypt, Turkey, and to a lesser extent, Syria and Lebanon; each of these, the Iraqi knows, considers itself more progressive than Iraq. Despite the common bond of Islam and pan-Arabism, Iraqis tend to mistrust their Near Eastern neighbors. During the war with Israel, this lack of faith was intensified by a popular belief, encouraged by governmental propaganda and a general unwillingness to admit fault, that only Iraq had assumed its share in the struggle.

The affinities and enmities of the royal house with the rulers of other Near Eastern nations do not necessarily reflect the general attitudes of the Iraqi people. The populace feels no special friendship for King Abdullah of Jordan, and no personal animosity toward King Farūq of Egypt. Egypt, however, is generally unpopular among Iraqis because of its assumption of leadership in the Arab world, and more recently, because of its failure in Palestine. Egypt is now resented more intensely by advocates of Syro-Iraqi union for its opposition to the scheme. Egypt's refusal to confirm the recent Security Council resolution to send troops to Korea, however, and the reference to UN injustice in Palestine in its statement of abstention, received widespread popular approval in Iraq. Turkey, whose occupation of Iraq has not been forgotten, is disliked by almost all Iraqis. Many among the politically minded further resent Turkey's rapid turn to the West. Iraqi Kurds are particularly bitter about Turkish suppression of Kurdish nationalism and the alleged cruelties suffered by Kurds in Turkey.

The Iraqi attitude toward the other Near Eastern states is strongly influenced by religion. The Sunnis are generally sympathetic to their predominantly Sunni neighbors, such as Syria and Lebanon. They have strong ties with the great Bedouin tribes and families of Central Arabia, though little sympathy with the Wahhabi belief. They admire Ibn Saud for his strength, and while the general feeling toward him among the Sunnis of Iraq as a whole could hardly be called one of friendship, it does not equal the deep-seated dynastic antagonism in that direction on the part of the Iraqi royal house and its close supporters. The Shiah, on the other hand, are predisposed toward Iran and their coreligionists in Syria and Lebanon, while their special animosity is directed against the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, because of doctrinal differences aggravated by the memory of the burning of Karbalā by Wahhabi raiders in the nineteenth century.

5. Attitude toward international organizations

The people of Iraq are generally apathetic toward Iraq's participation in international organizations. They neither trust international bodies to make decisions with equity nor credit them with the ability to carry out these decisions. They further feel that foreign states when acting collectively, even as international bodies, should not have the authority to make settlements which affect the sovereignty of Iraq. Iraqi participation in such international activities is undertaken primarily as an expression of national sovereignty and prestige.

a. ARAB LEAGUE — The prestige of the Arab League is not high in Iraq. While the politically informed were in general sympathy with the League in 1945, they were not prepared to surrender any of their sovereign rights in its behalf. Many who felt initially that the League was merely an instrument of British policy in the Near East have resented more recently the leading role played by Egypt in the organization. When the League

proved powerless to cope with the Palestine situation, most Iraqis lost faith in its ability to give effect to the aspirations of the Arabs.

b. UNITED NATIONS — Public opinion in Iraq leans overwhelmingly to the belief that the UN exists solely for the benefit of the great powers, just as before World War II it regarded the League of Nations as the instrument of the colonial powers of Europe. Since the 1947 recommendations on Palestine, the UN has meant to the Iraqis support of Zionist "imperialism." In common with the other Arab states, they claim to have lost all hope of UN justice or support for the smaller powers and have declared that they will participate in future international activities solely on the basis of self-interest.

Continued resentment toward the UN has prevented Iraqis from giving unqualified support to the Security Council resolutions on Korea. Iraq, which has likened the North Korean aggressors to the Zionists, has complained that the UN helped rather than hindered aggression in Palestine, and that its present position is inconsistent. Only the outright pro-Soviet elements in Iraq, however, profess sympathy for the Korean Communists.



FIGURE 42–4A. SHEIKHS OF THE SHAMMAR AL-JARBĀ' BEDOUIN, IRAQ, APRIL 1949
Ali Jawdat al-Ayyūbi, Iraqi Prime Minister, in center.

FIGURE 42–4B. SHAMMAR AL-JARBĀ' BEDOUIN IN CAMP, IRAQ, APRIL 1949

FIGURE 42–4C. MARSH ARAB VILLAGE, IRAQ, 1927
Arab *mashhūf* or skiff in foreground. Houses built of reeds in background.

FIGURE 42–4D. KURDISH TRIBESMEN, IRAQ, 1937
Two women in foreground.

FIGURE 42–4

FIGURE 42–5A. METALWORKERS' BAZAAR, BAGHDAD, 1949

FIGURE 42–5B. TURKOMAN COUPLE, KIRKŪK, 1930

FIGURE 42–5C. OUTDOOR COFFEE HOUSE, BAGHDAD, 1942

FIGURE 42–5D. MANDAEAN SILVERSMITHS, BAGHDAD, 1937
Characteristic heavy beard and modified Arab dress are shown. Apprentice at the left. Traditional methods and simple equipment in use.



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DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC



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TRIBES OF IRAQ



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

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